Systemic failure in macroeconomic modelling by Reynolds, Martin
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Systemic failure in macroeconomic modelling
Journal Item
How to cite:
Reynolds, Martin (2014). Systemic failure in macroeconomic modelling. International Journal of Applied Systemic
Studies, 5(4) pp. 311–328.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2014 Martin Reynolds; Inderscience Enterprises Ltd
Version: Accepted Manuscript
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1504/IJASS.2014.065695
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
311 | P a g e                 Reynolds (2014) Systemic failure in economic modelling pp.311-328 
 
Systemic failure in macroeconomic modelling 
Martin Reynolds 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
Terms like systemic crisis and systemic failure are used with increasing frequency particularly by 
journalists, politicians, as well as academics, to account for things going wrong in an increasingly 
complex and uncertain world. But what does systemic failure actually mean from a systems thinking 
perspective, and how might more effective thinking reduce incidences of systemic failure?  This paper 
argues that three interwoven traps of modelling contribute as a confluence towards systemic failure -  
reductionism, dogmatism, and managerialism.  Using the example of systemic failure of academic 
economics in averting the global financial crisis – as expressed by prominent economists themselves - 
each of the three traps is explored. The confluence of these traps working together are illustrated by the 
ideas from a tradition of critical systems thinking associated with systemic triangulation, and ideas from 
the science of political economy associated with the ‘iron triangle’. Some practical tools from systems 
approaches are suggested to counter traps of systemic failure using a suggested heuristic of systems 
thinking in practice. 
 
Keywords: Critical systems thinking, dogmatism, iron triangle, managerialism, reductionism, systemic 
failure, systemic triangulation, systems thinking in practice.  
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1. Systemic failure: an otherworldly event? 
 
The problem of modelling and systemic failure is expressed in an opinion paper authored by eight 
economists who gathered with other economists for a week of intense discussions in the wake of the 2007/8 
global financial crises at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy in Germany in 2008 (Colander et. al., 2009). 
The paper describes the systemic failure of academic economists to model appropriately in order to avert 
or warn against the impending events:  
 
“The global financial crisis has revealed the need to rethink fundamentally how financial 
systems are regulated. It has also made clear a systemic failure of the economics profession. 
Over the past three decades, economists have largely developed and come to rely on 
models that disregard key factors—including heterogeneity of decision rules, revisions of 
forecasting strategies, and changes in the social context—that drive outcomes in asset and 
other markets. It is obvious, even to the casual observer that these models fail to account 
for the actual evolution of the real-world economy. Moreover, the current academic agenda 
has largely crowded out research on the inherent causes of financial crises. There has also 
been little exploration of early indicators of system crisis and potential ways to prevent this 
malady from developing. In fact, if one browses through the academic macroeconomics 
and finance literature, “systemic crisis” appears like an otherworldly event that is absent 
from economic models. Most models, by design, offer no immediate handle on how to 
think about or deal with this recurring phenomenon. […] That, to us, is a systemic 
failure of the economics profession.” (ibid p.2 original italics) 
 
  
The description of systemic failure here resonates with a familiar wider notion of a collapse in the way 
things are supposed to link up or interrelate.  In a world where we increasingly appreciate that everything 
connects, failure is commonly regarded in terms of disabled connections. The antidote to systemic failure 
is often regarded in terms of  more ‘joined up thinking’ or ‘seeing the forest through the trees’.  So the 
Kiel authors identify the failure of economic models in not taking account of the intricate relationships of 
entities in the ‘real-world economy’.  Prevailing models, they suggest, actually marginalise or disregard 
key factors in the real-world such as the different levels of decision making, forecasting strategies, and 
changes in social context.   
 
In their paper, the Kiel authors document an accumulation of restrictive economic modelling practices.  
They also significantly note a failure amongst economists to responsibly convey the limitations of 
economic modelling to those using the models and those in wider society affected by the use of such 
models. So avoiding systemic failure is in-part about ‘getting the big picture’.  But failure might be rooted 
in at least two other interlocking respects. One is the need for surfacing and appreciating different 
perspectives. The claim that the “academic agenda has largely crowded out research” suggests a familiar 
academic sense of being closed-minded and insular with regards to ideas and perspectives from other 
disciplines or indeed unconventional perspectives arising within a discipline. 
 
Both ideas – capturing inter-relationships and engaging with different perspectives - can be associated 
with a more concise understanding of Systems. What is it about a system that can make systemic failure 
less otherworldly? A definition of a system developed by Open University systems academics and 
referred to by Morris (2009, p.16) suggests that a system is simply: 
 
 a collection of entities … 
 that are seen by someone … 
 as interacting together … 
 to do something. 
 
Using this definition shifts attention away from simply regarding systems as objective real world entities 
as commonly assumed in phrases like ‘the’ economic system or ‘the’ education system, towards systems 
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as individual and/or collective constructs embued with some sense of purpose.  Sometimes the distinction 
is made more explicit by referring to a ‘system of interest’ as against a ‘system’.  So a system comprises 
of some interrelationships among entities (i.e. ‘entities… interacting together’) seen from a particular 
perspective (‘seen by someone…to do something’). 
 
A third related aspect of systemic failure hinted at through the underlined words in the preceding sentence 
lies with the provisional nature of the models that we as humans use to make sense of inter-relationships 
and to engage with different perspectives.  For the purposes of this paper the term ‘system’ will be used 
synonymously with ‘model’– a conceptualisation or ‘system of interest’ relating to some real world 
entity, but ontologically different from the real world entity (cf. Checkland and Howell, 2004). Modelling 
is a human activity, and as such subject to imperfections –  human errors in not selecting the most 
appropriate variables over time and changing circumstances, and human bias in valuing or preferring 
particular models over others. Not being critically reflective of our models can be a significant factor in 
generating systemic failure more generally.     
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the usefulness of some systems ideas for grappling generically with 
issues of systemic failure, but using the concerns expressed by the Kiel authors on macroeconomic 
modelling by way of illustration. The next section explores ideas expressed in the Kiel paper in terms of a 
confluence of three traps of modelling – reductionism, dogmatism, and managerialism - reflecting the 
three generic contributions to systemic failure described above. The section following then introduces the 
idea of systemic triangulation – a methodological core idea in systems thinking developed by the systems 
philosopher and social planner, Werner Ulrich.  The section also explores the usefulness alongside 
systemic triangulation of the ‘Iron Triangle’ metaphor drawn principally from Political sciences, as a way 
of making sense of, and framing, the workings and confluence between the three traps of modelling. The 
final section introduces a systems thinking in practice heuristic – incorporating ideas of systemic 
triangulation -  as a means of guiding practice to avoid systemic failure. 
 
2 Systemic failure: three traps of modelling 
 
A common feature of systems – whether used for exploring inter-relationships or used more for 
negotiating among multiple perspectives – is their essential bounded nature. All our thinking is bounded 
in some way. In strategic management this idea comes across strongly through the important principle of 
‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1991). What makes systems thinking distinctive is the explicit manner in 
which boundaries are surfaced. Our mental constructs – the ways in which we think – are bounded as 
epistemological constructs. In a sense we are trapped by our thinking. Where systems are regarded as 
essentially conceptual constructs to make sense of reality, rather than actual real world entities, what is 
important is not just the potential usefulness of different constructs to improve situations but also the 
awareness and surfacing of such bounded constructs as potential traps that inhibit a more critical and 
systemic dimension of systems thinking.   
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Drawing on an analysis of the critical dimension of systems thinking (Reynolds, 2011a), there appear to 
be three essential traps associated with systems modelling that can lead to systemic failure: (i)  the trap of 
reductionism in not dealing appropriately with interrelationships; (ii) the trap of dogmatism in not dealing 
appropriately with contrasting perspectives; and (iii) the trap of managerialism in naively assuming 
comprehensive and impartial use of management tools or models. An example of this last trap is in 
fetishising management models as being completely ‘holistic’ (in dealing with all interrelationships) 
and/or completely ‘pluralistic’ (in dealing with all viewpoints with equal weight of concern).  Each trap is 
described briefly below in the context of the Kiel opinion paper. 
2.1 Capturing contexts of change: avoiding reductionism (Trap 1) 
 
"Only Connect ..... "  E. M. Forster (Howards Way) 
 
 
Any modelling of reality is, by its very nature, reductionist.  Models can only capture parts of any 
contexts of change. The task for appropriate systems modelling is to capture those parts of reality which 
are significant for the purpose of understanding reality. Reductionism occurs when the reductionist 
endeavour, say economic modelling, fails to capture significant influences and entities, or captures them 
in an inappropriate way, say, for example, translating immeasurable qualitative entities like emotion or 
environmental values, into monetary variables.   
 
The Kiel authors focus most of their critique on economic modelling based on what they call a prevailing 
‘conceptual reductionist paradigm’.  This is  expressed in the “representative agent approach in 
economics …[which] views the entire economy as an organism governed by a universal will…[It] blocks 
from the outset any understanding of the interplay between micro and macro levels” (Colander et. al., 
p.8).    
 
Prevailing economic models, the paper suggests, tend to exclude factors that generate crises.  For 
example, the authors claim that ‘systemic risk factors’ including different externalities and individual 
behaviours are simply not accounted for: “if one browses through the academic macroeconomics and 
finance literature, “systemic crisis” appears like an otherworldly event that is absent from economic 
models.” (ibid p.1).  
 
Likewise, prevailing models exclude particular actors such as non-rational stakeholders, and other 
networked stakeholders, that typically generate crises.  Models omit important extra-disciplinary ideas 
including Network theory and ‘self-organised criticality theory’ amongst others. In short financial 
modellers appear to generate an intra-disciplinary ‘silo’ mentality.  Moreover, prevailing models exclude 
longer term temporal changes of boom and bust  focusing rather on  shorter term periods characterised by 
economic stability. 
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To use a well-worn though significant adage amongst systems practitioners, a system is merely a map of a 
situation or territory, not to be confused with the actual territory. Arguably the prime purpose of systems 
thinking is to make simple the complex – that is, to bound the unbounded ontological complex realities 
variously referred to as ‘messes’ (Russell Ackoff), ‘the swamp’ (Donald Schön), or ‘wicked problems’ 
(Horst Rittel).  To use the language of communications engineering,  systems as conceptual constructs 
provide purposeful ways for generating meaningful ‘signals’ or patterns of abstracted data sets from the 
cacophonous ‘noise’ of reality (cf. Richardson, 2010 p. 2).  Whereas complexity science has made 
valuable and intriguing strides in capturing real world complexity, particularly through computational 
modelling, systems thinking prompts a more cautionary note against a comprehensive understanding of 
reality (see Fig.1).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Influence diagram illustrating reductionism in conventional thinking  
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates some pitfalls with systems modelling in reducing the complexity of situations to make 
them manageable.  Whilst modelling realities inevitably reduces the complexity of a situation, it can 
reinforce systemic failure through (i) generating further unforeseen effects on factors in the environment 
outside the purview of the model, as well as (ii) generating silo mentalities amongst practitioners 
(including, of course, professional economists) whose blinkedness is not helpful in providing more 
purposeful support.   The result of these two paths is an increase in complexity and uncertainty. 
 
The Kiel paper suggests something about there being a collapse in the way things are supposed to link up 
or interrelate.  In a world where we increasingly appreciate that everything connects, the antidote to 
systemic failure is holistic thinking – getting the bigger picture. So having a wider holistic viewpoint 
involves looking beyond, say, the ‘rational representative agent’,  and embracing more the interplay 
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between micro and macro levels of economic activity. Systems thinking is here characterised in terms of 
modelling wholes rather than parts. But crucially, wholes or systems are not pre-given. 
 
2.2 Engaging with multiple perspectives: avoiding dogmatism (Trap 2) 
 
"A systems approach begins when first you see the world through the eyes of another" 
(Churchman, 1968  p.231) 
 
Systemic failure can often be attributed to the sidelining of relevant perspectives.  Dogmatism is here 
understood as an adherence to one particular perspective or set of perspectives.   
 
There are different perspectives associated with modelling the economy. From a banker’s perspective 
economic modelling might be described as a system for enabling efficient use of monetary resources to 
promote profit and growth.  But from, say, an environmental activist’s perspective, economic modelling 
may be described as a system for challenging (or justifying) the depletion of natural resources.  
 
The Kiel authors make clear that contemporary financial models are focused solely on the rather narrow 
perception that economics is concerned only with the allocation of scarce resources.  The ideas used at the 
micro level of financial modelling are based upon the unquestioned appropriateness of the ‘dynamic 
general equilibrium model’. Models are built on unspoken assumptions; for instance: “asset-pricing and 
risk management tools are developed from an individualistic perspective…taken as given the behaviour 
of all other market participants” (Colander et.al., 2009 p.5).  This is not to suggest that all economists 
have worked on these assumptions or that all economists have systematically ignored, for example, the 
longer term boom and bust trajectories of economic activity. But the opinion paper does suggest a 
pervasive ignoring of key works associated with crises phenomena dating back from works of Walter 
Bagehot in 1873 to more contemporary economists such as Hyman Minsky since the 1980s.   
 
Perhaps the most significant charge of dogmatism implicitly made by the Kiel economists is in the 
suggestion that models are retained in the light of considerable external evidence that would question 
their validity: 
“The corner stones of many models in finance and macroeconomics are rather maintained despite 
all the contradictory evidence discovered in empirical research. Much of this literature shows that 
human subjects act in a way that bears no resemblance to the rational expectations paradigm and 
also have problems discovering ‘rational expectations equilibria’ in repeated experimental 
settings.” (Colander, 2009, pp.7-8). 
 
For West Churchman (1968), quoted at the beginning of this sub-section, systems thinking not only 
requires ‘building a bigger picture’ of the situation – for which he described a process of unfolding 
increasingly more variables from the context of use – but also appreciating other conceptual constructs or 
perspectives on the situation. The transition speaks of two worlds; one, the holistic ontological real-world 
‘universe’ of interdependent elements, encapsulating complex inter-relationships; another, an 
epistemological socially constructed world of ‘multiverse’ (cf. Maturana and Poerksen, 2004,   p.38), 
encapsulating differing constructs on reality.  Failure to appreciate the multiverse world results in 
dogmatism (see Fig. 2)    
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2.3 Reflecting on model limitations: avoiding managerialism (Trap 3) 
 
 “To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail” (Mark Twain) 
 
"No problem can be solved from the same consciousness that created it.  We have to learn to see 
the world anew."  (Albert Einstein)   
All systems/ models are partial.  They are necessarily partial – or selective – in the dual sense of (i) 
representing only a section rather than the whole of the total universe of interrelationships, and (ii) 
serving some stakeholder parties including practitioners -  and their interests - better than others (cf. 
Ulrich, 2002, p.41).  In short, no proposal, no decision, no action, no methodology, no approach, no tool, 
no model, no system, can get a total grip on the situation nor get it right for everyone  (Reynolds, 2008a).  
In using and (re)designing models we need to keep an eye on changing contexts of interrelationships and 
change and variety of different practitioner perspectives. 
 
The Kiel authors provide some alternative ideas for improved modelling. Their critique of reductionism 
calls for a more holistic approach to economic modelling involving for example attention to risk analysis, 
Network theory, and actor coordination, amongst other ideas.  Similarly their implicit critique of 
dogmatism advocates a more pluralistic approach including, for example, wider engagement with other 
economic viewpoints such as behavioural economics, or indeed other disciplines.  Moreover, the authors 
call for a wider engagement between financial modellers and the wider public sphere.   
 
But how holistic are the Kiel authors themselves?  Are there effects of leaving out the political domain of 
economic activity? Similarly, how engaging with other perspectives are they?  Behavioural economics 
can be important but what about ecological economics?  Also, what about engaging with other related 
disciplines – political sciences, anthropology, philosophy, for example.  And despite the open-access 
internet availability of the opinion paper,  to what extent are the authors merely talking to each other 
rather than engaging wider publics on a transdisciplinary dimension? 
 
In short, is there a risk of fetishising new improved models?  Figure 3 illustrates two influence loops of 
traps associated with systems thinking. When these traps are enacted, there is a risk of  
 
(i) holism – assuming comprehensiveness, and 
(ii) pluralism – assuming impartiality. 
 
 
 
Given the impossibility of being comprehensive and impartial, it may seem churlish to surface the 
weaknesses in any claims implicitly made around being holistic and pluralistic.  The Kiel authors have 
hinted at the potential traps of holism and pluralism.  As the authors point out, holistic models are to be 
encouraged but there is a need also to be transparent about the fragility of any improved models: “… 
while such models better capture the intrinsic volatility of markets, their improved performance, taken at 
face value, might again contribute to enhancing the control illusion of the naïve user. The increased 
sophistication … should not absolve the modellers from explaining their limitations to the users in the 
financial industry” (ibid. p.6 my italics).  
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These acknowledgements suggest a political as well as an ethical dimension to modelling. What is 
important here is a critical assessment on the boundaries of modelling; what’s in and what’s out, and 
importantly, who decides what’s left out.  Politics of modelling requires what Werner Ulrich has termed 
boundary critique – a tool based upon the idea of systemic triangulation from a tradition of critical 
systems thinking.  In the next section I will introduce Ulrich’s notion of systemic triangulation along with 
a wider comparable notion of the ‘iron triangle’ which can be used as a basis for understanding how 
systemic failure works, and how to avoid it. 
 
3 Systemic triangulation and the iron triangle 
 
Werner Ulrich introduced the methodological concept of systemic triangulation as an extension of the 
conventional concept of 'triangulation' as it is known in the empirical social sciences -  the idea that it 
makes sense to rely on different research methods/methodologies and theoretical perspectives to produce 
and validate research results. Ulrich’s idea is to rely not only on different methods and theories but also 
on alternative value sets and reference systems as a basis for working out and assessing practical 
propositions (cf. Ulrich, 2003 p.334).  The term 'systemic triangulation' as a label refers to what Ulrich 
calls an ‘eternal triangle’ of  interdependence between 'facts', 'values', and 'boundary judgements’ (Ulrich, 
1998, p.6; 2000, p. 252).  
 
The purposes behind models represent important judgements of boundary.  The ‘models’ referred to by 
the Kiel authors can be regarded as bounded conceptual systems.  They are ideas or tools used for making 
sense of situations such as global finance with the ultimate purpose of supporting improvement in such 
situations.  As with all forms of systems thinking, the models comprise of three factors which, in their 
mutual influences on each other, can generate either failure or success. The Kiel paper on systemic failure 
signal these through highlighting:  
 
 
1. the importance of interrelationships in situations of change and complexity;  
2. as viewed from practitioners’ contrasting perspectives in the act of managing change;  
3. expressed through ideas or models used to make sense of interrelationships and perspectives for 
managing change.   
 
Fig.4  illustrates the influences between these three entities in the form of a relationship reflecting 
Ulrich’s original notion of an eternal triangle. In my rendition of the triangle, ‘facts’ relate to the 
situations of change, ‘values’ relate to the practitioners managing change, and ‘boundaries’ relate to the 
ideas/ tools/ models used for managing change.1 
 
The interplay of arrows between judgements of ‘fact’, value judgements, and boundary judgements is 
described by Ulrich in his own rendition of an ‘eternal triangle’: 
 
“Thinking through the triangle means to consider each of its corners in the light of the other two. 
For example, what new facts become relevant if we expand the boundaries of the reference system 
or modify our value judgments? How do our valuations look if we consider new facts that refer to 
a modified reference system? In what way may our reference system fail to do justice to the 
perspective of different stakeholder groups? Any claim that does not reflect on the underpinning 
‘triangle’ of boundary judgments, judgments of facts, and value judgments, risks claiming too 
much, by not disclosing its built-in selectivity” (Ulrich 2003 p.334)  
 
 
                                                 
1 The ‘eternal triangle’ depicted in Ulrich’s original diagram (Ulrich, 2000, p. 252) is also different in that it depicts ‘values’ 
and ‘facts’ at opposing right and left sides of the triangle floor.  My reason for swapping over these triangular points is to help 
synchronise the triangulation with representations of the iron triangle and the systems thinking in practice heuristic discussed 
later in the article. 
321 | P a g
 
Figure 4
 
 
 
The triadic
‘systemic t
sometimes
 
The idea o
on the Pari
(Pulitzer an
the confere
success giv
politicians 
 
The iron tr
since been 
vested pow
American P
insipid ves
iron triangl
triangle ha
political ac
constructio
currency in
 
e          
 
 
 Triadic re
 relationshi
riangulation
 used to des
f the iron tr
s Peace Co
d Grasty, 1
nce deliber
en the insip
making the
iangle is a h
invoked pa
er. One po
resident D
ted interest
e in Ameri
s also been 
tivists as, f
ns in India 
 depicting 
  
lationship 
c
(adapted 
p in Fig. 4 
’, the othe
cribe relati
iangle was 
nference am
919).  Puli
ations.  He 
id self-con
 decisions. 
elpful conc
rticularly in
pular expre
wight Eisen
s in the cou
can politics
used with r
or example
(Roy, 1999
systemic fa
of influenc
hange, and
from ‘the et
draws on sy
r is more an
ons of pow
first expres
ongst victo
tzer was fru
suggested t
tained inter
 
ept in that 
 American
ssion of the
hower dur
ntry.  An in
 was the ec
eference to
, with Arun
).  Used as 
ilure. 
    Reynold
es between
 tools for m
ernal triang
nthesising 
 ontologica
er in particu
sed by Ralp
rious allied
strated wit
hat the resu
ests among
it speaks to
 politics to 
 iron triang
ing his 196
fluential ac
onomist Joh
 European p
dhati Roy i
a generic m
s (2014) Sys
 situations
anaging c
le’ of Ulric
two ideas; 
l (and meta
lar context
h Pulitzer a
 governme
h the viciou
ltant accor
st three set
 a wider sen
account for
le is the ‘m
1 President
ademic wri
n Kenneth
olitics (cf. 
n relation to
etaphor, th
temic failure in
 of change
hange  
h, 2000 p.2
one is Ulric
phorical) id
s.  
 political jo
nts followin
s cycle of v
d is not like
s of actors –
se of instit
 vicious cy
ilitary-indu
ial resignati
ter on the a
 Galbraith (
Hix and Ho
 her oppos
e iron trian
 economic m
 
, practition
52). 
h’s method
ea of the ‘
urnalist rep
g World W
ested inter
ly to have 
  the milita
utional entr
cles of insti
strial comp
on speech t
ctual mach
cf. 1952; 1
yland, 200
ition to larg
gle has acq
odelling pp.31
ers manag
ological ide
Iron Triang
orting criti
ar 1 in 191
ests at play 
long term 
ry, industry
apment.  It
tutionalised
lex’ used b
o warn of 
inations of 
967). The ir
5), and amo
e-scale dam
uired perva
1-328 
ing 
a of 
le’ 
cally 
9 
in 
, and 
 has 
 
y 
the 
on 
ngst 
 
sive 
322 | P a g e                 Reynolds (2014) Systemic failure in economic modelling pp.311-328 
 
Generically, the concept is now typically used to describe a confluence of interaction between three 
entities –  (i) some form of bureaucracy which represents the site of real world implementation of 
decisions (e.g., Ministries), (ii) interest groups/ individuals who stand to benefit from the implementation 
of decisions (e.g. usually commercial and corporate interests of various kinds), and (iii) decision makers 
themselves responsible for making decisions with supporting models for justifying decisions (e.g., 
Congress or Parliament).   
 
The three domains of an iron triangle might in turn relate to the methodological idea of systemic 
triangulation (depicted in Fig.4) and the particular imperatives and traps of modelling. Firstly, sites of 
implementation of decisions might be regarded as the ‘real world’ sites of inter-relationships to be 
modelled (invoking ‘factual judgements’ and the risks of reductionism). Secondly, interest groups might 
be regarded as constituting key stakeholders and perspectives including the modellers themselves 
(invoking ‘value judgements’ and the risks of dogmatism). Thirdly, decision makers require tools or 
models to support their decision making (invoking ‘boundary judgements’ and risks of managerialism).   
Figure 5 is an expression of an iron triangle depicting these triadic influences with traps of thinking, as 
described above, associated with the systemic crises arising from prevailing economic modelling.   
 
Items labelled 1 to 3 in Fig.5 relate more specifically to the concerns of those engaged with modelling.  
The methodological concerns regarding traps of thinking are aligned with ontological concerns relating to 
the wider  trap of an iron triangle.   The three corners of the triangle represent the three aspects of 
systemic failure signalled in the Kiel paper:  firstly, the problem in formulating judgements of ‘fact’ 
regarding the universe of inter-relationships in situations of interest; secondly, engaging with the 
multiverse of value judgements associated with  peoples’ contrasting perspectives including those from 
disciplines outside of economics; and  thirdly, making effective boundary judgements expressed through 
ideas or models used to make critical sense of inter-relationships and perspectives in order to support 
effective decision making.   
 
So how might the triangulation of the iron triangle be translated from the rather purposive fixed 
relationships in ‘traps of thinking’ towards a more purposeful notion of creative or ‘enlightened thinking’ 
for better systems design?  The underpinning ideas of the iron triangle and systemic triangulation can be 
traced back to traditions of early American pragmatism spearheaded by Charles Peirce (cf. Peirce, 1878), 
and continued with practitioner philosophers including the psychologist William James and educationalist 
John Dewey.   Such practitioners contributed significantly to their fields in promoting more purposeful 
professional praxis. The challenge in systems thinking is to translate such critical insight into a more 
purposeful framework; a challenge that can serve the wider endeavour of continually reframing expert 
support for policy design (cf. Reynolds, 2008b).  
  
323 | P a g
 
 
 
 
4 Sy
 
 
A systems 
described a
involved w
change. Th
situations o
perspective
amongst st
up thinking
by three fra
and a fram
systems fra
learning de
based Open
developme
 
Figure 6  il
 
e          
 
Figure
stemic d
thinking in
bove: (1) r
ith making
ese can be 
f complexi
s on the sit
akeholders 
 with actio
meworks r
ework for r
mework (R
vice or heu
 University
nt and auth
lustrates th
  
 5 The iron
esign: a
 practice he
eal-world c
 change, an
complemen
ty, change,
uation; (ii) 
involved w
n to bring a
espectively
esponsibilit
eynolds 20
ristic. The 
 postgradu
orship in on
e constituen
 triangle o
(adapte
 system
uristic buil
ontexts of c
d (3) the id
ted with th
 and uncert
practically
ith and affe
bout moral
 – framewo
y (fwR) - c
08a). More
heuristic - s
ate program
e of the ke
t activities
    Reynold
 
f economi
d from Rey
 
s thinkin
ds on the th
hange and 
eas and con
ree interrela
ainty, and u
 engaging w
cted by the
ly justifiabl
rk for unde
onstituting 
 recently th
ystems thin
me to whi
y modules 
 and entitie
s (2014) Sys
c modelling
nolds, 2008
g in pra
ree entities
uncertainty
cepts – inc
ted activiti
nderstandi
ith multipl
 situation,  
e improvem
rstanding (
what elsew
is framewo
king in pra
ch the autho
(Open Univ
s of the heu
temic failure in
 and traps
a) 
ctice he
 associated
, (2) stakeh
luding syste
es: (i) stepp
ng key inter
e often con
and (iii) res
ents.  Thes
fwU), fram
here has be
rk has been
ctice -  is th
r has with 
ersity, 201
ristic for sy
 economic m
 
 of thinkin
uristic 
 with system
olders or pr
ms - as too
ing back fr
-relationsh
trasting per
ponsibly di
e activities
ework for p
en called an
 translated 
e namesak
colleagues 
2). 
stems think
odelling pp.31
g 
ic failure 
actitioners
ls for effec
om messy 
ips and 
spectives 
recting join
 are suppor
ractice (fw
 overall cr
in terms of
e of the UK
contributed
ing in prac
1-328 
 
ting 
ed-
ted 
P), 
itical 
 a 
-
 
tice.  
324 | P a g
 
 
The heuris
systems tra
with the th
 
First, the n
expression
Firm (Beer
‘systems th
about real w
 
Second, th
based on th
as well as g
ideas in thi
and a range
others (Ro
to multiple
‘multiverse
2004 p.38)
 
e          
tic provides
dition has d
ree traps of
eed for ‘joi
s of first or
 1972), and
inking’ in 
orld interc
e developm
e epistemo
uiding our
s tradition i
 of problem
senhead and
 stakeholde
’, as distin
.  
  
Figure
 a benchma
eveloped a
 thinking.  
ned-up-thin
der cyberne
 system dy
The Fifth D
onnectedn
ent of cons
logical noti
 activities in
nclude seco
-structurin
 Mingers 2
r perspectiv
ct from assu
 6 Heurist
(adapte
rk for mitig
 variety of 
king’ to all
tics such as
namics und
iscipline (S
ess and feed
tructivist to
on of conce
 reshaping
nd-order c
g methods
001).  Such
es or, as M
ming acce
    Reynold
ic of system
d from Rey
ating again
tools for de
eviate redu
 the viable 
erpinning L
enge 1990)
back.   
ols for addr
ptual const
 reality – se
ybernetics 
including s
 works rais
aturana pu
ss to some o
s (2014) Sys
s thinking
nolds, 2011
st systemic
aling with 
ctionism. S
systems mo
imits to Gr
. The holist
essing prob
ructs used 
rving the n
such as auto
oft systems
e importan
ts it, how to
ntological 
temic failure in
 in practic
b) 
 failure in m
each of the 
ystems idea
del underp
owth  (Mea
ic principle
lems of do
for develop
eed for mak
poeisis (M
 methodolo
t questions 
 practice be
‘universe’ 
 economic m
e 
anaging c
three entiti
s in this tra
inning The
dows et al.
 is ontolog
gmatism.  S
ing knowle
ing new re
aturana and
gy, cogniti
regarding h
ing epistem
(Maturana a
odelling pp.31
 
hange.  The
es associate
dition inclu
 Brain of th
 1972), and
ical; a state
ystems are
dge about r
alities. Sys
 Varela 19
ve mapping
ow to respo
ologically
nd Poerkse
1-328 
 
d 
de 
e 
 
ment 
 here 
eality 
tems 
80) 
 and 
nd 
 
n 
325 | P a g e                 Reynolds (2014) Systemic failure in economic modelling pp.311-328 
 
A third critical systems tradition deals with the methodological limitations and inevitable problems of 
selectivity in thinking holistically and interconnectedly, and being pluralistically multiverse whilst 
avoiding tendencies of managerialism. Critical systems thinking (CST) is an umbrella term used in 
association with this third tradition (Ulrich 2003; Jackson 2003).  The framework in Fig.6  provides an 
expression of CST derived particularly from Ulrich’s work on boundary critique.  
 
Whilst some tools may have a particular focus on one of the three activities and associated entities, the 
effectiveness of use in supporting decision making can be gauged according to how well all three entities 
are dealt with. The rich history and current variety of systems tools prompt questions as to how they may 
relate to each other and what emphasis is given to the context of use, the users or practitioners, or the 
actual tools being used (Reynolds and Howell, 2010). The tools used in systems thinking in practice need 
not be exclusively recognised as being derived from what some recognise as the Systems tradition.  They 
may derive from traditions ranging from Complexity science to Performance arts such as puppetry.  Any 
tools that attempt to:  
 
(i) make sense of a context of complex realities whilst  
(ii) enabling amongst practitioners different perspectives on such realities to flourish in order to  
(iii) enable systemic improvement in the real world,  
 
qualify to be exemplars of systems thinking in practice.   
 
What matters in systems thinking in practice are not just the expression of these three entities, but also the 
interplay amongst all three entities and associated activities, and the resultant dynamics of supportive 
change that emerge.  
 
5 Summary  
 
The final paragraph of the Kiel opinion paper states:  
 
“We believe that economics has been trapped in a sub-optimal equilibrium in which much of its 
research efforts are not directed towards the most prevalent needs of society… Defining away the 
most prevalent economic problems of modern economies and failing to communicate the 
limitations and assumptions of its popular models, the economics profession bears some 
responsibility for the current crisis. It has failed in its duty to society to provide as much insight as 
possible into the workings of the economy and in providing warnings about the tools it created. It 
has also been reluctant to emphasize the limitations of its analysis. We believe that the failure to 
even envisage the current problems of the worldwide financial system and the inability of standard 
macro and finance models to provide any insight into ongoing events make a strong case for a 
major reorientation in these areas and a reconsideration of their basic premises.”  (Colander et. al., 
2009, p.14) 
 
From a systems thinking in practice perspective, systemic failure in economic modelling results from 
three interwoven factors -  (i) disconnects amongst essential contextual entities by omission of key 
variables from models, (ii) disengagements amongst relevant perspectives associated with different 
stakeholders typically marginalised within economics, and (iii) dysfunctional application of boundary 
judgements in the models used to support economic decision making.  The three traps of thinking 
described above in terms of reductionism, dogmatism and managerialism, are not new.  The trap of 
reductionism in particular has wide currency in the popular mantra for advocating more (holistic) systems 
thinking. 
 
The confluence of three traps working together through a process of systemic triangulation is perhaps less 
widely appreciated.  When coupled with the wider triangulation of the Iron Triangle appreciated by 
political scientists and political activists there is possibly an increase sense of resonance and relevance 
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between what economists do in their modelling activities and what significance they may have further 
afield.  Ralph Pulitzer, originator of the contemporary use of ‘iron triangle’ in reflecting on what he 
regarded as the long-term failure of  post- First World War Peace conference, died in June 1939, a few 
months before the outbreak of the Second World War.  John Kenneth Galbraith, the most prominent 
academic to have enriched the notion of ‘iron triangle’ through scholarly work died in 2006, a few years 
before the global financial collapse which many claim vindicated much of what Galbraith had argued 
regarding the paucity of orthodox economics (e.g. Kates, 2010;  Latham, Prowle, and Wheatley, 2012)  
 
A particularly helpful place to start any reorientation and  reconsideration of international finance might 
be through critically exploring the dynamics of macro-economic modelling that supports economic 
decision making. David Colander and his seven economist colleagues provide a promising start.  The 
systems thinking in practice heuristic provides one means of supporting such explorations.  
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